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24 
INSUFFICIENT ANALYSIS OF  
INSUFFICIENT ACTIVITY 
Kenneth S. Abraham*† 
A response to David Gilo & Ehud Guttel, Negligence and Insufficient  
Activity: The Missing Paradigm in Torts, 108 Mich L. Rev. 277 (2009). 
In Negligence and Insufficient Activity: The Missing Paradigm in Torts, 
David Gilo and Ehud Guttel argue that negligence law encourages ineffi-
ciently high and low levels of activity because negligence law ordinarily 
does not take activity levels into account. They suggest that the law should 
impose liability for failing to take safety precautions—even where precau-
tions would not be cost-justified—whenever the threat of this liability 
negates the incentive for an actor to choose an insufficient level of activity. 
Until now, the literature on the interaction between liability standards and 
activity levels has failed to recognize the possibility of inefficiently insuffi-
cient activity. I commend Gilo and Guttel for both their insight and their 
explication of it. 
Despite the novel analysis of an interesting omission in tort law scholar-
ship, the proposal for insufficient activity liability (“IAL”) would greatly 
complicate tort litigation, and the authors offer no evidence that it would 
deliver significant benefits in return. Rather, this theory of liability would 
create several new problems, for which the authors propose no solutions. 
First, IAL is riddled with causal uncertainties that the authors do not fully 
acknowledge. Second, juries may impose IAL unreliably because they 
would consider IAL an unwarranted infringement on autonomy. Third, the 
adoption of IAL would create fact-finding difficulties that conventional neg-
ligence and traditional strict liability do not face. In short, the authors’ 
analysis of how IAL would work in practice is insufficient. 
I. Causal Responsibility and the Scope of Liability 
Gilo and Guttel recognize that IAL will require proof of a causal con-
nection between the defendant’s failure to take a precaution that is not cost-
justified and the plaintiff’s injury. But they too easily dismiss the uncertain-
ties that this requirement will generate. They use a number of different 
terms for this form of liability, sometimes calling it “strict liability” and 
elsewhere calling it “negligence liability” for “failures to invest in precau-
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tions whose cost is higher than their benefit in reducing harm.” It is true that 
imposing liability for failure to take a precaution that is not cost-justified is 
a version of “strict liability,” in that it is liability without fault. But the use 
of the various terms is problematic because strict liability and negligence 
apply different causation requirements.  
Different forms of IAL would have different implications for proving 
causation. In negligence cases, a defendant is not liable unless the plaintiff 
would not have been injured but for the defendant’s failure to take a cost-
justified precaution. In contrast, traditional activity-based strict liability re-
quires no causal connection between the precautions the defendant did or 
did not take and the injury the plaintiff suffered. All injuries arising out of 
the characteristic risks of conducting the activity result in liability. 
The proposal for IAL appears to contemplate a negligence-like causation 
requirement. IAL would be imposed only if the plaintiff would not have 
been injured but for the defendant’s failure to take a particular precaution. 
As Gilo and Guttel suggest, liability might be imposed for the failure to in-
stall noise insulating material in a factory, the failure to use safety railings in 
bleachers, the failure to supply a bartender at a party, or the failure to install 
a sprinkler system in a classroom—even though these precautions would not 
have been cost-justified. In each instance, the plaintiff would have to prove 
a causal connection between the defendant’s failure to take the precaution 
and the plaintiff’s injury. Thus, although IAL would create a new form of 
liability, IAL would also retain a causation requirement analogous to the 
traditional cause-in-fact requirement of liability in negligence. 
But exactly how would a plaintiff prove causation in such cases? Noise 
insulation does not prevent all hearing loss, safety railings do not prevent all 
falls, and the presence of a bartender at a party does not prevent all guests 
from becoming intoxicated (to use Gilo and Guttel’s own examples). Yet the 
success of IAL depends, in part, on the possibility of proving which hearing 
losses, falls, or drunken mishaps the precautions in question would have 
prevented.  
Adducing such proof would actually be extremely difficult in most cases 
of IAL. In contrast, traditional tort law does not pose problems of causal 
uncertainty in cases such as these. Strict liability depends only on the fact 
that the defendant engaged in the activity. Factual causation is also a simple 
matter, as it is proven by demonstrating the simple causal connection be-
tween engaging in the activity—operating a noisy factory, holding an event 
with bleachers, or sponsoring a party and serving alcohol—and the plain-
tiff’s injury. In these cases, liability attaches regardless of whether greater 
precautions would have prevented the injuries at issue. And in traditional 
negligence cases, the fact that taking a precaution would substantially re-
duce the probability of causing harm often provides the decisive proof that 
the defendant acted negligently by failing to take that precaution. The “P” in 
Judge Learned Hand’s B < PL negligence calculus refers to this probability. 
Consequently, plaintiffs in negligence actions seldom face the vexing prob-
lem of proving which injuries were caused by the failure to take a cost-
justified precaution—though proving causation can become a serious issue 
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where failure to take the precaution does not substantially increase the prob-
ability of harm. 
But under IAL, almost by definition, the failure to take the precaution in 
question would not substantially increase the probability of harm—because 
otherwise, that failure probably would be negligent. As a result, plaintiffs 
will seldom have affirmative evidence of factual causation. In the unusual 
case where there is evidence relevant to causation, it will likely show that 
failure to take the precaution did not substantially increase the probability of 
harm—because, otherwise, failure to take the precaution would be negli-
gent. Plaintiffs would only have a reasonable chance of proving causation in 
cases that reveal a substantial increase in the probability of causing a very 
minor harm or a disproportionately large cost of preventing a substantial 
increase in harm. Paradoxically, then, in the very set of cases in which it 
might be feasible to impose IAL because there is relevant causation evi-
dence, IAL will not be imposed because the same evidence would show a 
low probability of causation. As a consequence, there will actually be very 
little IAL in practice. 
Unfortunately, Gilo and Guttel barely acknowledge this problem. They 
relegate it to a footnote, conceding only that “where optimal investment in 
precaution does not entirely remove the risk of harm, proving causation may 
present some difficulty . . . .” This is insufficient treatment of the very prob-
lem posed by most of their own examples. 
II. Optics and Autonomy 
Law has an expressive function. It sends a message to those it governs, 
to those who enforce it, and to the public at large. Sometimes a message is 
just a message. But sometimes the nature of the message influences how 
faithfully the rule described by the message will be enforced. The message 
IAL sends would likely undermine its enforcement, because IAL ignores—
or at the least appears to ignore—a traditional sphere of autonomy. 
At points, Gilo and Guttel contend that IAL would send the message that 
defendants should be liable for non-negligent injuries where they have de-
liberately restricted their activity levels so as to avoid liability in negligence. 
That is a bit like holding an actor liable for engaging in otherwise-legitimate 
liability avoidance, and is itself likely to provoke an ambivalent reaction by 
judges and juries. 
But this is not the only reasonable interpretation of IAL. An alternative 
interpretation maintains that IAL strongly invades a potential defendant’s 
autonomy. This interpretation suggests a judgment that a defendant simply 
did not engage in enough of the activity in question—that it did not hire 
enough employees, admit enough patrons to its stadium, hold a large enough 
party with alcohol, or (as the authors suggest) pollute enough. Whether or 
not this is an entirely fair interpretation, it is certainly the message that 
many defendants will contend IAL has sent to them, as well as to judges and 
juries.  
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Yet this message will likely undermine the normative force of the IAL 
rule because the law does not ordinarily compel actors to engage in more of 
a particular activity. Since IAL crosses into this traditional sphere of auton-
omy, judges and juries will hesitate to impose it. In an effort to address this 
concern, Gilo and Guttel contend that IAL is not liability for nonfeasance, 
but for misfeasance, and that IAL therefore does not risk infringing on au-
tonomy in the way that liability for nonfeasance infringes on autonomy. 
Calling IAL misfeasance, however, does not neutralize this autonomy con-
cern. Even if IAL stands for something more than nonfeasance, it still 
constitutes liability for failing to engage in more of an activity than the actor 
has chosen to engage in. And no matter how often economic analysis ex-
plains that liability can be understood as a mere price rather than a sanction, 
the authors’ very invocation of the term “misfeasance” (otherwise why not 
simply call it “feasance?”) to characterize the IAL defendant’s conduct im-
plies that, although the defendant is legally free to incur liability rather than 
to increase its activity level, it would be wrong to do the former rather than 
the latter. 
This would be mere semantics were it not for the fact that the misfea-
sance in question results from failing to engage in a higher level of activity. 
The difference between wrongfully failing to do something and failing to do 
something entirely optional is significant. Most forms of insufficient activity 
would undoubtedly fall into the latter category. Failing to buy a larger house 
than one wanted, or failing to buy more stock than one wished to buy, for 
example, would not be considered wrongful or worthy of criticism, whether 
inefficient or not. For the same reason, it is prima facie an infringement of 
autonomy to impose a “duty mandating adjustment of one’s activity levels” 
and to enforce that duty with civil liability, if the adjustment is upward, not 
downward. 
III. Complicating Trials with Unmanageable Questions of Fact 
The general unwillingness of negligence law to assess the optimality of 
activity levels avoids the difficulty of weighing the third-party social costs 
and benefits of the defendant’s activity. If negligence turned on whether the 
defendant engaged in excess activity, then courts would often have to pursue 
this difficult fact-finding exercise. Although third-party social costs and 
benefits are implicated, in theory, in safety-level disputes, the impact of this 
consideration can usually be ignored because it is likely to be small. For 
example, the marginal social cost or benefit that accrues to third-parties 
when the defendant exceeds the speed limit—faster delivery of goods car-
ried by the defendant—is ordinarily so small that it does not figure in 
determinations of negligence.  
It is far more difficult to ignore third-party costs and benefits, however, 
when the focus is on activity levels—whether allegedly excessive or insuffi-
cient activity. We need only to look to Gilo and Guttel’s own examples to 
see why. The question of whether it was negligent for a commercial estab-
lishment to fail to provide a bartender at a party is circumscribed and 
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manageable. The question whether to impose liability for failing to admit 
more patrons to the party, however, implicates issues regarding modes of 
recreational enjoyment and social intercourse that tort law is ill-equipped to 
resolve. The same would be true of the authors’ fire sprinkler example, 
which would require an assessment of the educational costs and benefits of 
having larger classrooms that could hold more students, in order to deter-
mine whether the defendant should be held liable under IAL for the failure 
to have used larger classrooms. As was demonstrated decades ago by James 
Henderson in Expanding the Negligence Concept: Retreat from the Rule of 
Law, case-by-case adjudication is not well suited to the determination of 
“polycentric” questions such as these.  
Gilo and Guttel imply that courts can avoid these problems by focusing 
on the set of cases most amenable to the application of IAL. These are cases 
in which, among other things, the cost of a precaution at a higher activity 
level exceeds the private benefit derived from increasing the activity level, 
but that cost is lower than the social gain from the additional activity and the 
diminished risk of harm. These cases, however, will not come to the courts 
in pre-identified form. Merely suggesting that the cost of obtaining relevant 
evidence “might be prohibitive” and that there should be “evaluation of ac-
tivity levels” where this is “feasible” is not enough, because the parties will 
attempt to raise these questions at trial whenever the law permits them to do 
so. 
Consequently, courts will often have to deal with factual disputes over 
whether the defendant’s activity level was sufficient. Parties will introduce 
evidence of the social benefits associated with the defendant’s allegedly 
insufficient current activity level and the higher, allegedly sufficient level. 
Judges and juries will then have to resolve polycentric factual disputes over 
the net social costs and benefits of different possible activity levels, and 
these disputes will pose even greater problems than questions of optimal 
social activity levels where the parties do not dispute the underlying facts. 
Finally, Gilo and Guttel neglect another important question: whether the 
decision to impose IAL poses a question for the court or for the jury. The 
jury decides the question of liability in a standard action for negligence. In 
contrast, the court resolves the question in a strict liability action, although it 
may submit certain factual questions to the jury. This division of responsi-
bility has significant implications, because in most instances, plaintiffs will 
allege other theories of liability in addition to IAL, such as conventional 
negligence. If the question of whether to impose IAL is up to the court, then 
the jury will likely hear evidence regarding activity levels that will be ir-
relevant to the negligence question it must decide. On the other hand, if the 
jury must decide both negligence and IAL, then the court must instruct the 
jury to find the defendant liable if it was negligent, and also liable if it was 
not negligent but has engaged in an insufficient amount of the activity oth-
erwise conducted using reasonable care. To the typical jury, this sort of 
instruction will seem confusing, counterintuitive, and bizarre. 
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All things considered, then, IAL is a prescription for complicating tort 
litigation without any evidence, let alone assurance, that the advantages of 
IAL will outweigh its significant disadvantages.  
 
